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Abstract
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing d distinct types of indivisible goods,
when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an un-
known distribution. The goods are not in limited supply, but can only be produced at a limited
rate and are costly to produce. The seller observes only the bundle of goods purchased at each
day, but nothing else about the buyer’s valuation function. Our main result is a dynamic pric-
ing algorithm for optimizing welfare (including the seller’s cost of production) that runs in
time and a number of rounds that are polynomial in d and the approximation parameter. We
are able to do this despite the fact that (i) the price-response function is not continuous, and
even its fractional relaxation is a non-concave function of the prices, and (ii) the welfare is not
observable to the seller.
We derive this result as an application of a general technique for optimizing welfare over
divisible goods, which is of independent interest. When buyers have strongly concave, Ho¨lder
continuous valuation functions over d divisible goods, we give a general polynomial time dy-
namic pricing technique. We are able to apply this technique to the setting of unit demand
buyers despite the fact that in that setting the goods are not divisible, and the natural frac-
tional relaxation of a unit demand valuation is not strongly concave. In order to apply our
general technique, we introduce a novel price randomization procedure which has the effect of
implicitly inducing buyers to “regularize” their valuations with a strongly concave function.
Finally, we also extend our results to a limited-supply setting in which the number of copies of
each good cannot be replenished.
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1 Introduction
Consider the problem of an online retailer who sells a large variety of goods. The seller can in
principle produce or procure more copies of each good as needed, but only at a limited rate, and
at some per-unit production /procurement cost that varies by good. In each round, the seller
can dynamically set the price for each type of good. Each buyer has an unknown valuation func-
tion defined (in general) over bundles of goods, and quasi-linear utility for money. Each buyer
chooses which item to buy to optimize his utility function given the prices. The seller observes
the purchased bundle—i.e. the revealed preferences of the buyer—but not the buyer’s valuation of
the purchased bundle (or of any other bundle). The buyer’s valuation function is drawn indepen-
dently from a fixed but unknown distribution, called the buyer distribution. The seller’s objective
is to optimize social welfare: the expected buyer valuation of the purchased good minus its pro-
duction cost. Social welfare, like profit, is a natural objective for the seller: in particular, sellers
attempting to grow their market (rather than exploit an existing monopoly position) might prefer
to optimize social welfare rather than profit in the short term.
A tempting first attempt at solving this problem would be to simply set the price for each
good to be equal to its cost of production, which would indeed maximize social welfare if there
were no other constraints on the bundles of items purchased by buyers. However, this solution is
unsatisfactory when additional supply can only be generated at a bounded rate, because the cost
of production bears no relationship to the buyers’ values for a good. Because of this, setting prices
equal to costs can result, for example, in every buyer demanding the largest possible quantity of
the same good, which the seller may not be able to accommodate. In a more realistic setting, there
will be constraints on the rate of production and resupply for each good. Hence, we study the
welfare maximization problem in which we impose the additional constraint that the expected
bundle purchased (in expectation over the draw of the buyer) lies in a bounded set. Because
constraints of this sort bind across buyers, setting prices equal to costs fails, and the problem
requires a nontrivial solution.
Since the buyer distribution is unknown, the seller cannot directly compute the prices that
optimize social welfare. Instead, she faces a learning problem: she can try different prices over
time and observe the responses from random buyers drawn from the distribution, and try to learn
the optimal price vector. More formally, the goal is to use a small number of rounds to learn a
price vector that nearly optimizes expected social welfare. We want the algorithm’s guarantees
hold in the worst case over the choice of distributions over buyer valuation functions.
Essentially, we are studying a welfare-optimization version of the well-known dynamic pricing
problem, also known as learn-and-earn, with d > 1 goods for sale. (Prior work on dynamic pricing
focused on profit maximization.) At a very high level, the main challenge presented is to learn the
price response function—i.e. the function mapping prices to expected bundles purchased—and
then optimize it with respect to welfare. Moreover, this is a high dimensional function (for large
d), and so one must overcome the curse of dimensionality. Prior work on non-Bayesian dynamic
pricing (e.g., Babaioff et al. (2015); Besbes and Zeevi (2009, 2012); Broder and Rusmevichientong
(2012); den Boer and Zwart (2014); Keskin and Zeevi (2014); Wang et al. (2014)) dealt with this
challenge by making strong assumptions on the price response function itself. Typical assump-
tions include Lipschitzness (Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, 2012; Wang et al., 2014) (which allows for
discretization in low-dimensional problems), and particularly for high dimensional problems,
linearity (den Boer and Zwart, 2014; Keskin and Zeevi, 2014) or concavity (Babaioff et al., 2015;
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Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Wang et al., 2014).1 However, assumptions of this sort are not well sup-
ported by a micro-economic foundation. In fact, natural assumptions on the buyer valuations do
not necessarily result in price-response function with these properties.
In this paper, we pursue a different approach which stands on strongermicroeconomic founda-
tions: we make assumptions on the form of the valuation functions directly (and no assumptions
on the distribution over valuation functions), and show that we can work with the price response
function that results. This is the case despite the fact that our problem is high dimensional, and
the price response function that results from our assumptions is not concave. We also face an
additional challenge: unlike profit, welfare is not observable, and we can observe the purchased
bundle but not the buyer’s valuation for that bundle. Nevertheless, we design algorithms that find
a near-optimal price vector with respect to welfare, in a number of rounds that is polynomial in d
and the accuracy parameter. (Whereas, for example, a naive solution based on discretization and
Lipschitzness of the price-response function requires a number of rounds that is exponential in
d.) Our results also extend to the limited-supply setting.
1.1 Our Contributions
Ourmain result solves the problem in the setting of indivisible goodswhen buyers are unit-demand
or, alternatively, when the seller only allows each customer to buy a single item. Surprisingly, no
other assumptions are needed! Further, we give a general result for the setting of divisible goods
under certain assumptions on the valuation functions. In fact, we show how this general result
can be leveraged to yield the result for unit demands.
Both settings work as follows. There are d goods. In each round, prices are set and one buyer
arrives and purchases hermost preferred bundle from the set of feasible bundles. The seller incurs
production/procurement costs for each sale, which are linear in the sold bundle.
We give a computationally efficient and round efficient algorithm for finding a nearly welfare-
maximizing price vector subject to a constraint on the expected consumption. Let SW(p) be the
expected social welfare that results from setting prices p. The seller would like to set prices to
ensure that the expected per-round purchase of each good j, denoted xj (p), is bounded above by
some supply sj . This models a realistic scenario in which the seller’s inventory can be replenished,
but only at a limited rate. For example, perhaps at most one truckload of goods can be stocked
per day. Approximating a restocking period constraint with a constraint on the expected per-
customer purchase is reasonable if the restocking period corresponds to a large number of rounds,
because then the realized consumption over these rounds concentrates around is expectation. In
the following, we will write x(p) = (x1(p), . . . ,xd(p)) to denote the bundle induced by prices p.
Divisible goods. Departing from previous work, instead of making assumptions about the func-
tional form of the price-response function, which depends on the buyers’ valuations in aggre-
gate, we make assumptions on the individual buyers’ valuations themselves. Specifically, we as-
sume the buyers’ valuations are strongly concave and Ho¨lder continuous. (These assumptions
are satisfied by a large class of well-studied valuation, including CES and Cobb-Douglas as shown
1Prior work that does notmake assumptions on the shape of valuations or demand curves is either restricted to sell-
ing a single good (d = 1) (Babaioff et al., 2015; Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003), or suffers from the curse of dimensional-
ity and comes with performance guarantees relative to the discretized prices rather than all prices (Badanidiyuru et al.,
2013).
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in Roth et al. (2016)). The sold bundles are constrained to lie in the bounded set F ⊂ Rd+ (e.g.
F = [0,1]d means at most one unit of each good can be purchased).
Theorem 1.1 (Divisible Goods). Assume divisible goods, and buyers with strongly concave and and
Ho¨lder-continuous valuations. There is an algorithm that takes as input parameters d,α,δ > 0 and a
supply vector s ∈ Rd>0, such that with probability at least 1 − δ, the algorithm outputs a price vector
p ∈ Rd+ such that
x(p) ≤ s and SW(p) ≥ max
p∈Rd+: x(p)≤s
SW(p)−α. (1)
The number of rounds and the total computation time are polynomial in d, 1α and log
1
δ .
Unit-demand buyers and indivisible goods. We use our result for divisible goods to give a poly-
nomial time dynamic pricing algorithm for welfare maximization in the indivisible goods setting
when buyers have unit demand valuations. Here we consider distributions D over price vectors
p ∈ Rd+, rather than fixed price vectors p. To extend our notation, let x(D) = Ep∼D [x(p)] and
SW(D) = Ep∼D [SW(p)]. We prove:
Theorem 1.2 (IndivisibleGoods). Assume indivisible goods, and buyers with unit-demand valuations.
There is an algorithm that takes as input parameters d,α,δ > 0 and a supply vector s ∈ Rd+, such that
with probability at least 1−δ the algorithm outputs a distribution D over price vectors p ∈ Rd+ such that
x(D) ≤ s and SW(D) ≥ max
distributionsD′ : x(D′ )≤s
SW(D′)−α. (2)
The number of rounds and the total computation time are polynomial in d, 1α and log
1
δ .
In the generality that we state our theorem, using a distribution over prices rather than a fixed
price vector is unavoidable. The reason has to do with how the buyers break ties when they are
indifferent between goods. As shown in Hsu et al. (2016), without further genericity assumptions,
it can be that no fixed pricing can induce optimal (or even feasible) allocations if buyers use unco-
ordinated tie breaking rules. Instead, tie-breaking needs to be coordinated amongst the buyers: the
tie-breaking rule needs to be different for different buyers, and essentially needs to be specified
by the mechanism. The randomness in our pricing scheme serves as a coordination mechanism
amongst buyers (since each buyer faces a different realization of prices).
Remark. In both settings, we prove more general theorems in which we express our results in
terms of a stronger benchmark—the welfare of the optimal lottery over allocations, without re-
striction to those that can be induced by posted pricing.2
The above theorems can be reformulated in terms of cumulative regret for a given time horizon
T . Then the execution of the algorithm in the respective theorem corresponds to an exploration
phase of bounded length. The price vector p computed by the algorithm is used in an exploita-
tion phase consisting of all subsequent rounds. Theorem 1.1 guarantees that OWel completes in
poly(d, log 1δ ) · α−m rounds, for some constant m. Expected regret relative to the best fixed price
2A posted price vector (resp., distribution over them) computed by an algorithm can only hope to compete with
the best posted price vector (resp., distribution). Thus, the mathematical statement behind (ii) is that the posted price
benchmarks used in the theorems are in fact equivalent to the stronger benchmark.
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vector can be upper-bounded by 1 for every round of exploration, and α+δ per round of exploita-
tion. Optimizing the choice of α and δ, we obtain regret poly(d, logT ) · Tm/(m+1). Theorem 1.2
implies a similar corollary for the unit-demands setting.
Extension to limited supply. We extend our results to a limited-supply setting. In our model,
there is a fixed horizon of T rounds and the seller has a non-replenishable supply of T sj units
of each good j. T and s ∈ [0,1]d are known in advance. Each day, the seller will set prices and
a random buyer will purchase their preferred bundle until either the time horizon or the sellers’
supply is exhausted, whichever comes first.
For a pricing policy π, we use SWtot(π) to denote its expected total welfare.
3 A “fixed-vector”
pricing policy uses the same price vector p in all rounds. Likewise, “fixed-distribution” pricing
policy always draws the price vector independently from the same fixed distribution D. The
expected total welfare of these policies is denoted, resp., SWtot(p) and SWtot(D).
In the setting of divisible goods, we simply use the algorithm from Theorem 1.1 with the same
constraint vector s. The price vector p computed by this algorithm achieves high expected total
welfare for a given problem instance: we prove that it is nearly optimal compared to the best
fixed-vector pricing policy. Further, it is nearly optimal compared to any pricing policy.
Likewise, in the setting of unit demands, we use the algorithm fromTheorem 1.2 with the same
constraint vector s. The distributionD computed by this algorithm is nearly optimal compared to
the best fixed-distribution pricing policy with x(D) ≤ s.
Theorem 1.3. Consider dynamic pricing with limited supply. Fix constraint vector s ∈ Rd+ and time
horizon T > 32 log(T )/s∗, where s∗ =minj sj .
(a) Consider the setting of divisible goods. When the algorithm from Theorem 1.1 is given as input
d,s,α,δ, with probability 1− δ it outputs a price vector p ∈ Rd+ such that
SWtot(p) ≥ sup
pricing policies π
SWtot(π)−αT −O
(√
T log(T )/s∗
)
.
(b) Assume indivisible goods and unit demands. When the algorithm from Theorem 1.2 is given as
input d,s,α,δ, with probability 1− δ it outputs distribution D over price vectors such that
SWtot(D) ≥ sup
distributions D′ with x(D′) ≤ s
SWtot(D′)−αT −O
(√
T log(T )/s∗
)
.
The number of rounds and the total computation time are polynomial in d, 1α and log
1
δ .
1.2 Our Techniques
Our general results for divisible goods build on a crucial structural property: even though the ex-
pected welfare of the induced bundle x(p) is not concave in the price vector p, it becomes concave
if we treat the bundle itself as the decision variable. We illustrate this via a simple 1-dimensional
example, adapted from Roth et al. (2016):
3Considering expected welfare per round is not enough, as one pricing policy may halt sooner than another.
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Example 1.4. There is a single good (d = 1), and a single buyer with valuation v(x) =
√
x. he seller’s
cost function is c(x) = x. If price p is posted, the buyer’s utility for x units is
√
x − p · x, so she would
purchase x∗(p) = 1
4p2
units of the good. Consequently, the welfare is
SW(p) = v(x∗(p))− c(x∗(p)) = 1
2p
− 1
4p2
.
Note that welfare is not a concave function of the price. However, if we write the welfare as a function of
x = x∗(p), the purchased amount of good, this function is concave:
SW(x) = v(x)− c(x) = √x − x.
Thus, we would like to optimize expected welfare as a function of the induced bundle. How-
ever, we only control prices and not induced bundles. To address this, our algorithm has two
“layers,” where the outer layer optimizes over induced bundles, and the inner layer finds a price
vector which approximately induces a given bundle. Another challenge is that welfare is not
observed, since we do not observe buyer valuations. Instead, we find a way to approximate the
subgradients of welfare, and use noise-tolerant subgradient descent to optimize over the bundles.
We build on and extend the result of Roth et al. (2016) for the special case of a single buyer
and unlimited supply (which focuses on profit rather than welfare). The main distinction is single
buyer vs. distributions over buyers; in other words, Roth et al. (2016) assume that for a given price
vector the outcome is deterministic, whereas in our paper it is drawn from a fixed but unknown
distribution over the possible outcomes.
The “inner layer” of our algorithm extends the algorithm in Roth et al. (2016) from a single
buyer to distributions over buyers. This extension presents several technical challenges, and an-
swers one of their main open questions. In particular, we analyze a generalization of the convex
programming technique used in Roth et al. (2016) to accommodate a distribution over (arbitrarily
many) buyers. We cannot use the “outer layer” from Roth et al. (2016) because it requires direct
observations of the objective function to feed into a procedure for zeroth-order optimization, and
our seller cannot directly observe the buyers’ welfare (unlike profit, which is observable). Instead,
we develop a new technique to obtain the subgradient for the welfare function so as to enable
first-order optimization. Also, we remove a major assumption of homogenous buyer valuations.
As stated, our general result does not apply to unit demand buyers over indivisible goods. In
order to cast this problem as a divisible goods problem, we view buyers as having linear valua-
tions over divisible goods, optimizing over the set of bundles that have at most unit ℓ1 norm. The
bundle that maximizes a linear function is always at a vertex of the feasible region, and hence
is integral. That is, it is the bundle purchased by a unit-demand buyer in the indivisible goods
setting. However, there is a substantial difficulty: our general technique relies on buyer valuation
functions being strongly concave, a condition not satisfied by linear functions. A standard way
to obtain strong convexity in the convex optimization literature is to add a strongly convex regu-
larizer to the objective function. However, we do not get to modify the buyer’s objective function
in this way. Instead, we perturb the price vectors proposed by our general dynamic pricing algo-
rithm with Gumbel noise. Doing so has the property that the expected bundle purchased by each
buyer (where expectation is taken over the price perturbation) is the bundle that maximizes the
buyer’s linear valuation function, plus an entropy regularization term (Warmuth, 2009). Thus, in
expectation over our perturbations, we can view buyers as optimizing valuation functions which
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are strongly concave over the ℓ1 norm—even though for every fixed perturbation, buyers are max-
imizing some linear function and thus buy a unit bundle of indivisible goods. By perturbing the
price vectors used over the run of our algorithm for divisible goods, therefore, we can optimize
welfare over these “regularized” buyers. By reducing the noise rate (and hence the implicit regu-
larization parameter), we approach the optimal welfare of the actual, unit-demand buyers.
The extension to limited supply (Theorem 1.3(a)) relies on a structural result about bandits
with knapsacks (Badanidiyuru et al., 2013), a general framework of which dynamic pricing with
limited supply is a special case. We use a non-standard “embedding” of dynamic pricing into this
framework, and a concentration inequality for total welfare that requires a somewhat delicate
proof.
1.3 Related Work
Our setting is related to several lines of work. First, dynamic pricing, a.k.a. learn-and-earn, focuses
on a seller with a large inventory of each good, facing a stream of buyers with unknown valuations.
This is a large line of work, mainly in operations research — see Boer (2015) for a review. Most
related are non-Bayesian approaches. As mentioned above, the main distinction is that we make
assumptions on the buyer valuations rather than on the price response function. Also, the learn-
and-earn literature does not consider welfare-optimization, to the best of our knowledge.
Second, our problem can be viewed as an instance of themulti-armed bandits problem (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi
2012; Gittins, 1989), a well-studied abstract framework in which an algorithm repeatedly chooses
actions (e.g., price vectors) and receives rewards (e.g., revenue from a sale). The main issue
is the tension between acquisition and usage of information, a.k.a. the exploration-exploitation
tradeoff. Bandit algorithms are directly applicable to dynamic pricing either via discretization
(Babaioff et al., 2015; Badanidiyuru et al., 2013; Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003) or via assump-
tions on expected revenue.4 The main distinction is (again) that solutions to bandit problems
tend to make assumptions directly on the rewards, in part because they do not model the finer
structure behind the rewards (such as valuation functions).
Third, there are several papers on welfare-optimizing posted pricing in combinatorial auc-
tions (Balcan et al., 2008; Blum et al., 2011; Chakraborty et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2015). These
papers tackle more difficult scenarios with non-divisible goods and non-IID valuations, and ac-
cordingly obtain weaker, multiplicative guarantees. Also, the pricing is either static (Balcan et al.,
2008; Feldman et al., 2015) (not changing over time), or changing over time but not adapting
to the observed purchases (Blum et al., 2011; Chakraborty et al., 2013). This research is mainly
motivated by connections to mechanism design for combinatorial auctions.
Fourth, there is a large literature on revealed preferences, starting from Samuelson (Samuelson,
1938), see Mas-Colell et al. (1995); Rubinstein (2012); Varian (2006) for background. Most work
in economics has focused on the construction of utility functions that explain or rationalize a given
sequence of price/bundle observations, e.g. Afriat (1967). A recent literature studies the problem
of predicting purchase decisions given past observations at different price points (Balcan et al.,
2014; Beigman and Vohra, 2006; Zadimoghaddam and Roth, 2012). More related to our paper
is Amin et al. (2015) who study the problem of iteratively setting prices to maximize the profit
obtained from a single budgeted buyer (who repeatedly makes purchase decisions) with a linear
4E.g., if expected revenue is concave in prices, one can apply bandit algorithms for concave rewards (Agarwal et al.,
2013; Bubeck et al., 2015; Flaxman et al., 2005; Hazan and Levy, 2014).
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utility function. The most related paper in this line is Roth et al. (2016), as discussed in the pre-
vious subsection. Ours is the first paper in this line of work able to handle indivisible goods. A
related, but distinct literature focuses on learning valuation functions from example evaluations of
those functions (Balcan et al., 2012), rather than from example maximizations of those functions
(as in the revealed preference literature).
1.4 Map of the Paper
Section 3 contains the our general result for divisible goods (a generalization of Theorem 1.1). Our
application to unit demand valuations over indivisible goods, and the perturbation techniques
that go into deriving this result are presented in Section 4. The limited supply setting is treated in
Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. To improve the flow of the paper, some details are deferred
to the appendix.
2 Model and Preliminaries
There is a seller selling d different types of goods to a sequence of buyers arriving one after another
in rounds. Each buyer’s valuation v is drawn independently from an unknown distribution ψ
over a finite class V of valuation functions over the goods, where |V | = n.5 6 Both ψ and V are
unknown to the seller. Throughout, we will use i to index the buyer’s types in V , and write vi for
the valuation function for a buyer of type i, and ψ(vi) for the probability mass on buyers of type i.
At each round t, the seller posts a price vector p = pt ∈ Rd+, and the t-th buyer with valuation
v ∼ ψ makes a purchase to maximize his utility under these prices. In particular, we consider two
different settings: one with divisible goods and the other with indivisible goods.
Divisible goods Each valuation v : Rd+ → R+ is a function from (fractional) bundles of goods to
values. Under prices p, the buyer with valuation v will purchase the utility-maximizing bundle
x∗v(p) ≡ argmax
x∈F
[v(x)− 〈x,p〉]
where F ⊂ Rd+ denotes the set of feasible bundles available for purchase.
Indivisible goods We consider unit-demand buyers, who will either purchase exactly 1 unit of
some good or nothing. Each buyer’s valuation is defined by a value vector v ∈ Rd>0 such that vj
denotes her value for 1 unit of the j-th good. At round t, a buyer with valuation v purchases
x∗v(p) ≡ argmax
j∈[d]∪{⊥}
[
vj − pj
]
.
where ⊥ denotes the choice of buying nothing (we define v⊥ = p⊥ = 0), and we allow arbitrary
tie-breaking rules.
The seller has a (known) cost vector c ∈ Rd+ such that the cost of producing a unit of good j
is cj . The seller wishes to set prices so as to optimize the expected social welfare — the expected
5We take V to be finite only for convenience. Our results do not depend on n = |V |, so it can be arbitrarily large.
6Throughout, R+ = {x ∈R | x ≥ 0} and R>0 = {x ∈ R | x > 0} denote non-negative reals and positive reals, resp.
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valuation of the buyer’s purchased bundle or item minus its production cost. In particular, if the
seller posts a price vector p over the goods, the expected social welfare is
SW(p) = E
v∼ψ
[v(x∗v(p))− c(x∗v(p))] . (3)
where we write c(x∗v(p)) to denote the production cost for the purchase x∗v(p). For any distribution
D over prices, the expected welfare is defined as SW(D) = Ep∼D [SW(p)].
Computational model We will think of the algorithm as having access to a revealed preference
oracle ReP(ψ): given any input price vector p ∈ Rd+, it will draw a random valuation v from ψ, and
return the purchase decision x∗v(p). Our goal is to design computationally efficient algorithms to
compute optimal prices using only polynomially many queries to ReP. Notably, the expected or
realized social welfare is not observable to the algorithm, since it cannot observe v(x∗v(p)).
2.1 Noisy Subgradient Descent
A key ingredient in our algorithms is the ability to minimize a convex function (or maximize a
concave function), given access only to noisy sub-gradients of the function. We accomplish this
using the gradient descent algorithm. Below we recap some necessary background.
Let C ⊆ Rd be a compact and convex set of diameter at most D (w.r.t. ℓ2 norm). A subgradient
of a function f : C → R at point x ∈ C is any vector g ∈ C that satisfies the inequality f (y) ≥
f (x) + 〈g,y − x〉 for any point y ∈ C. The set of all subgradients at x is denoted ∂f (x). If f is
differentiable, the only subgradient g is the gradient ∇f (x).
The basic subgradient descent method is an iterative algorithm that starts at some point x1 ∈ C
and iterates the following equations
yt+1 = xt − η gt , and xt+1 =ΠC(yt+1)
where η is the learning rate and gt ∈ ∂f (xt) is a subgradient of the function f at point xt , and
ΠC(x) = argminy∈C ‖x − y‖ denote the projection operator onto C.
Now, we will assume that gt and/or xt are subject to noise. We will use two variants of the
algorithm, which operate under two different models of noise. In the first model, the algorithm
only has access to unbiased estimates of the subgradient.
Theorem 2.1 (Zinkevich (2003)). Suppose that f is convex, and for some constant D,G, the estimates
of the subgradients satisfy E [gt] ∈ ∂f (xt) and ‖gt‖ ≤ G for all steps t, and the diameter of the set satisfies
‖C‖ ≤ D. Then if we run the subgradient descent method with step size η = D/(G√T ), then for any T
and any initial point x1 ∈ C, the point z = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt satisfies
E [f (z)] ≤min
x∈C
f (x) + 2DG/
√
T .
In the second model, the algorithm has access to the noiseless subgradients, but the points xt
are adversarially perturbed after the projection.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that f is convex, fix constants D,E, and G. Suppose that the gradient descent
algorithm performs the following update in each iteration
yt+1 = xt − η gt and xt+1 =ΠC(yt+1) + ξt
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such that gt ∈ ∂f (xt) and ξt ∈ Rd is a noise vector. Suppose that ‖gt‖ ≤ G and ‖ξt‖ ≤ E, xt ∈ C for all
steps t, and the diameter of the set satisfies ‖C‖ ≤ D. Then if we run the subgradient descent method
with step size η =D/(G
√
T ), for any T and any initial point x1 ∈ C, the point z = 1T
∑T
t=1xt satisfies
f (z) ≤min
x∈C
f (x) +DG/
√
T +GE
√
T .
The proof is similar to the standard analysis of gradient descent (e.g., see Theorem 3.1 in
Bubeck (2015)). For the sake of completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of this result in
Appendix B.
3 A General Algorithm in the Divisible Goods Setting
This section is dedicated to the divisible good setting: we give a computationally efficient algo-
rithm for finding a price vector that approximately optimizes social welfare subject to the con-
straint that the expected per-round demand of each good j is no more than sj . Specifically, let
x∗ψ(p) denote the expected bundle purchased by a random buyer under the prices p (or the induced
bundle by p), that is
x∗ψ(p) = Ev∼ψ
[x∗v(p)] .
Given access to the revealed preference oracle ReP, the algorithm finds an approximately optimal
price vector p using polynomially queries to ReP and guarantees that x∗ψ(p) ≤ s. Our algorithm
consists of two layers, and we present it in three main steps.
1. First, we analyze a pertinent convex program and derive several structural results. In par-
ticular, we show that the expected social welfare can be expressed as a concave function of
the induced bundle.
2. Next, we present the inner layer of the algorithm: given any target bundle xˆ, we can itera-
tively find price vectors pt such that the induced bundle x∗ψ(p
t) converges to xˆ over time.
3. Finally, we show how to derive subgradients of the expected social welfare function from
information available. The outer layer of the algorithm will then use (noisy) subgradient
descent to optimize the welfare function over the bundle space.
We make the following assumptions on the feasible set F and each valuation function v ∈ V .
Assumption 3.1 (Feasible set). We assume that F is convex, closed, has a non-empty interior7 and
bounded norm: ‖F ‖2 ≤ R for some parameter R.8 A canonical example is F = [0,1]d : each buyer can
simultaneously buy up to one unit of each good.
Assumption 3.2 (Valuations). Each valuation function v in V satisfies:
1. v is monotonically increasing in each coordinate. (This can be relaxed to Assumption 3.4.)
2. v is (λ,β)-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to the ℓ1 norm over F , for some λ ≥ 1 and some absolute
constant β ∈ (0,1]. Namely: |v(x)− v(x′)| ≤ λ · ‖x − x′‖β1 for all x,x′ ∈ F .
7See Definition A.1 for a formal definition.
8For a set C ⊂Rd and a norm ‖ · ‖, we write ‖C‖ = supx∈C ‖x‖. When the norm is unspecified, it is assumed to be ℓ2.
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3. v is σ-strongly concave over F — for all x,x′ ∈ F , v(x′) ≤ v(x) + 〈∇v(x),x′ − x〉 − (σ/2) · ‖x− x′‖22.
These assumptions on the valuations are satisfied by a large class of well-studied valuation
functions, including Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas (See Roth et al.
(2016) for a proof). We crucially rely on a use property of strongly concave functions: any point
in the domain that is close to the minimum in objective value is also close to the minimum in
Euclidean distance(see Lemma A.2).
3.1 A Stochastic Convex Program
Let us say that a bundle xˆ ∈ Rd+ is inducible if there exists a price vector p ∈ Rd+ such that x∗ψ(p) = xˆ.
Note that each inducible bundle xˆ is a convex combination of n bundles (purchased by all the
buyers) in F , so it must lie in the set F .
A centerpiece in our analysis is the following welfare maximization convex program that char-
acterizes the relation between the posted prices and inducible bundles.
Definition 3.3. For any bundle xˆ ∈ F , let convex program SCP(xˆ) be the following
max
x∈F n
∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)vi(xi ) (4)
such that
∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)xij ≤ xˆj for every j ∈ [d] (5)
xi ∈ F for every vi ∈ V (6)
Let VAL(xˆ) be the optimal value of the convex program SCP(xˆ). We also say that SCP(xˆ) is supply-
saturating if its optimal solution x• saturates all of the supply constraints defined by eq. (5), that is∑
i ψ(vi)x
•
ij = xˆj for all j.
To interpret the above as a stochastic welfare maximization program, consider a market in
which there are d types of goods and each good j has supply xˆj . For each valuation function vi ∈ V ,
we introduce a buyer i with this valuation, who shows up to the market with probability ψ(vi).
We use a vector xi = (xi1, . . . ,xid ) ∈ F to represent the bundle of goods allocated to a buyer i if he
shows up. Then the program is precisely computing an allocation over all buyers to maximize the
expected welfare subject to the constraint that the expected demand is no more than the supply
given by xˆ.9
Assumption 3.4 (Relaxing monotonicity in valuations). In fact, the assumption that each valuation
in the class V is increasing can be relaxed. Our algorithm works as long as the class V and the feasible
set F guarantees that SCP(xˆ) is supply-saturating for any xˆ ∈ F . For the sake of generality, our analysis
will rely on the supply saturation condition instead of the monotonicity of the valuations. This will be
useful for applying the algorithm to the indivisible goods setting.
If the valuations in the class V are increasing functions, the optimal solution of SCP(xˆ) will
saturate all of the supply constraints in eq. (5).
Claim 3.5. Suppose that each valuation v ∈ V is monotonically increasing in each coordinate. Then for
any xˆ ∈ F , the convex program SCP(xˆ) is supply-saturating.
9Similar construction of such stochastic convex programs also appeared in Devanur et al. (2012).
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For each of the supply constraints in eq. (5), we can introduce a dual (price) variable pj and
write down the following partial Lagrangian
Lxˆ(x,p) =
∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)vi(xi )−
d∑
j=1
pj

∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)xij − xˆj
 (7)
We can also consider the Lagrange dual function of the convex program gxˆ : R
d → R:
gxˆ(p) = max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x,p). (8)
We will mostly focus on the case where xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
, which we can show is a sufficient con-
dition for inducibility.10
Lemma 3.6. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be a bundle, then xˆ is inducible.
Proof. Consider the convex program SCP(xˆ). Since the convex program satisfies the Slater’s condi-
tion, strong duality gives
max
x∈F n
min
p∈Rd+
Lxˆ(x,p) = min
p∈Rd+
max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x,p) = VAL(xˆ)
Furthermore, since SCP(xˆ) is supply-saturating, the optimal solution satisfies Evi∼ψ
[
x•i
]
= xˆ. Let p•
be the optimal dual solution. It follows that
x• = argmax
x∈F n
L(x,p•) = argmax
x∈F n
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(xi)−
d∑
j=1
p•j

∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)xij − xˆj

= argmax
x∈F n
∑
i
ψ(vi)
(
vi(xi)− 〈p•j ,xi〉+ 〈p•, xˆ〉
)
Note that the expression inside the argmax is linearly separable across i. Therefore,
x•i = argmax
xi∈F
[vi(xi)− 〈p•,xi〉+ 〈p•, xˆ〉] = argmax
xi∈F
[vi(xi )− 〈p•,xi〉] (9)
It follows that x•i = x
∗
vi
(p•) for each i, and hence the price vector p• induces the bundle xˆ.
Next, we show that the prices that induce the bundle xˆ are an optimal solution of the La-
grangian dual, and the bundles purchased by each buyer in response to these prices form the
unique primal optimal solution.
Lemma 3.7. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be a bundle, and let pˆ ∈ Rd+ be a price vector such that x∗ψ(pˆ) = xˆ. Then
• the price vector pˆ is an optimal dual solution for SCP(xˆ), and
10The restriction that the bundle be positive in each coordinate is necessary — a bundle with zero in some coordinate
may not be inducible. Consider the same simple setting in Example 1.4 where d = 1 and there is a single buyer with
valuation v(x) =
√
x. Because the marginal valuation at 0 is infinity, there is no bounded price to induce the buyer to
purchase 0 units of the good.
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• the vector x• ∈ F n such that x•i = x∗vi (pˆ) for each i is the unique optimal primal solution.
A very nice consequence of Lemma 3.7 is that whenever the induced bundle xˆ is fixed, the
realized bundles purchased by buyers of each type are also fixed. This allows us to express the
expected social welfare as a function only of the induced bundle. In particular, the expected
valuation for inducing xˆ in expectation is exactly VAL(xˆ). This suggests a different way to express
the welfare: as a function of the induced bundle (as opposed to a function of the price vector
defined in eq. (3)). For each xˆ ∈ F , we can define
SW(xˆ) = VAL(xˆ)− 〈c, xˆ〉. (10)
We can show that the expected social welfare for inducing xˆ in expectation is exactly SW(xˆ)(see ClaimC.1).
More importantly, by rewriting the welfare as a function of the bundle, we obtain a concave objec-
tive function. This is crucial for us to obtain an efficient algorithm later.
Lemma 3.8. The expected social welfare function SW : F → R as defined in eq. (10) is concave.
With all of structural results above, we are ready to give our two-layered algorithm for finding
the welfare-maximizing prices.
3.2 Inner Layer: Converting Target Bundles to Prices
Even though we can express the expected welfare as a concave function of the induced bundle,
we still cannot directly optimize the function because the seller only controls the prices of the
goods instead of the expected induced bundle itself. To optimize over the bundle space, we give
an algorithm that finds a price vector that approximately induces any target expected bundle xˆ.
Specifically, suppose that the seller has some target bundle xˆ in mind, we can learn a price vector
pˆ such that the expected induced bundle is close to the target bundle:
∥∥∥∥xˆ − x∗ψ(pˆ)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ε.
In Lemma 3.7, we show that the prices that exactly induce the target bundle xˆ are the opti-
mal dual solution for the convex program SCP(xˆ), which is the price vector p that minimizes the
Lagrangian dual function gxˆ. We will show that if we can find an approximate minimizer for gxˆ,
we can then approximately induce the target expected bundle xˆ. In particular, we will apply the
noisy gradient descent method (Theorem 2.1) to minimize the function gxˆ, and for the sake of
convergence of the algorithm, we will restrict the search space for the price vector to be
P (ε) =
p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖2 ≤
√
dλ(1/β)
(
4d
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β (11)
where ε is the target accuracy parameter. First, we will show that the minimax value of the La-
grangian remains close to VAL(xˆ) even when we restrict the dual variables/prices to be in P (ε).
Lemma 3.9. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
. There exists a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈F n
min
p∈P (ε)
Lxˆ(x,p) = min
p∈P (ε)
max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x,p) = R-OPT
Moreover, VAL(xˆ) ≤ R-OPT ≤ VAL(xˆ) + ε2σ4 .
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The next result translates the approximation error in minimizing the function gxˆ to the error
in inducing the target bundle xˆ by making use of the strong concavity of the valuations in V .
Lemma 3.10. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
and p′ be a price vector in P (ε) such that gxˆ(p′) ≤minp∈P (ε) gxˆ(p) +α
for some α > 0. Let x′ = x∗ψ(p
′) be the expected bundle induced by prices p′. Then ‖x′ − xˆ‖2 ≤ 2
√
α/σ.
Therefore, in order to (approximately) induce a target bundle in expectation, we just need to
compute an (approximate) minimizer for the Lagrangian dual function gxˆ. We first show that we
can compute an unbiased estimate of the gradient of gxˆ by using the observed bundle purchased
by a random buyer.
Lemma 3.11. Let p ∈ Rd+ be any price vector, and x∗v(p) be bundle purchased by a buyer with valuation
function v under prices p. Then
E
v∼ψ
[xˆ − x∗v(p)] = xˆ − x∗ψ(p) = ∇gxˆ(p).
The result of Lemma 3.11 shows that we can obtain unbiased estimates of the gradients of
the function gxˆ at different prices, as long as we can obtain unbiased estimates for the expected
demand x∗ψ(p). In the next section, we will give another technique to obtain unbiased estimates
for the gradients. Given access to unbiased estimate of the gradients of gxˆ, we can rely on the
noisy subgradient descent method (and its guarantee in Theorem 2.1) to minimize the function
gxˆ. Note that the algorithm will only find a point that approximately minimizes the function in
expectation, but we can get an approximate minimizer with high probability using a standard
amplification technique — running the subgradient descent method for logarithmically many
times, so that one of the output price vectors is guaranteed to be accurate with high probability.
More formally:
Lemma 3.12. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be any target bundle. There exists an algorithm that given any target
accuracy ε and confidence parameter δ as input, outputs a list P of log(1/δ) price vectors such that with
probability at least 1−δ, there exists a price vector pˆ ∈ P that satisfies
∥∥∥∥x∗ψ(pˆ)− xˆ
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ε. Furthermore, the
running time, the length of the list and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly(d,1/ε, log(1/δ)).
Lastly, we have one remaining technical problem to solve: given a set of price vectors P in
which at least one price vector can approximately induce the target expected bundle xˆ, we need
to identify one such price vector. To accomplish this, we will simply post each price vector p ∈ P
repeatedly, to obtain polynomially many observations from the buyers and compute the empirical
average bundles over these polynomially many rounds. We select the price vector whose empirical
average purchased bundle is closest to the target bundle xˆ. Putting all the pieces together, we
obtain our full algorithm BunToPrice (formal description in Algorithm 2 in the appendix).
Theorem 3.13. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be any target bundle. For any target accuracy parameter ε and
confidence parameter δ, the instantiation BunToPrice(xˆ, ε,δ) outputs a price vector pˆ that with prob-
ability at least 1− δ satisfies ‖xˆ − x∗ψ(pˆ)‖ ≤ ε. Furthermore, the number of queries to ReP is bounded by
poly(d,1/ε, log(1/δ)).
3.3 Outer Layer: Welfare Maximization
Finally, we combine the subroutine BunToPricewith subgradient descent to find the welfaremax-
imizing prices. At a high level, we will use subgradient descent to optimize the function SW over
the bundle space, and along the way use the algorithm BunToPrice to obtain prices which induce
each target bundle that arises along subgradient descent’s optimization path. To ensure that the
per-round expected demand for each good j is bounded by some supply sj , the algorithm will
optimize over bundles in the set S = {x ∈ F | xj ≤ sj for each j ∈ [d]}.
There are several technical challenges remaining. First, in order to optimize the concave func-
tion SW using subgradient descent, we need to compute a subgradient for each bundle the subgra-
dient descent method chooses at intermediate steps. The following result establishes a very nice
property that the price vector that induces each target bundle xˆ gives us a simple way to compute
a subgradient in ∂SW(xˆ). In particular, this means we can obtain a subgradient of the function SW
using our subroutine BunToPrice.
Lemma 3.14. Let xˆ ∈
(
R
d
>0∩F
)
, and pˆ be the price vector that induces xˆ. Then (pˆ − c) ∈ ∂SW(xˆ).
Remark. Lemma 3.14 also shows that the welfare-optimal solution always prices every good at
cost or higher, and hence welfare-optimal solutions are always no-deficit. To see this, note that if
the prices p induce expected bundle x, then (p − c) is a subgradient of the welfare function at x,
where c denotes the production cost vector. Hence, if for any good j, we had pj < ci , the gradient
would be negative in that coordinate, and we could increase welfare by reducing the demand of
good j, contradicting optimality.
Second, at each iteration t, subgradient descent may require a subgradient at some bundle
xt , but because of the error in BunToPrice, we only find prices to approximately induce the tar-
get bundle. To overcome this issue, we will rely on the analysis of subgradient descent under
adversarial noise (given in Theorem 2.2).
Lastly, instead of optimizing over the entire set S , we will optimize over a slightly smaller set
Sξ = {x ∈ F | ξ ≤ xj ≤ sj − ξ}.
This allows us to settle two issues: (1) we can guarantee that all of the induced bundles lie in the
set S despite the error of BunToPrice and (2) each bundle in Sξ is guaranteed to be inducible since
it is strictly positive in every coordinate (as required by Theorem 3.13).
Lemma 3.15. For any ξ ∈ (0,1),maxx∈S SW(x)−maxx′∈Sξ SW(x′) ≤ λ(dξ)β +
√
dξ‖c‖.
Putting all the pieces together, we obtain ourmain algorithmOWel (full description presented
in Algorithm 3). To establish the welfare guarantee of Dˆ, we will compare to an even stronger
benchmark—thewelfare of the optimal lottery over allocations. In particular, given any constraint
vector s ∈ Rd+1+ , a feasible lottery over allocations is a randomized mapping π : [n] → F that
assigns each buyer to a randomized bundle such that Evi∼ψ [π(i)] ≤ s. Let OPTlot be the optimal
social welfare achieved by a lottery over allocations. The following is the formal guarantee of
OWel (corresponding to Theorem 1.1).
Theorem 3.16. For any accuracy parameter α > 0, confidence parameter δ > 0, and subset S = {x ∈
F | xj ≤ sj for each j ∈ [d]} given by a supply vector s. Given query access to ReP, the instantiation
OWel(α,δ,s) outputs a price vector p′ that with probability at least 1− δ satisfies x∗ψ(p′) ≤ s and
SW(p′) ≥OPTlot −α.
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Furthermore, both the run-time of the algorithm and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by
poly(d,1/α,1/σ,1/λ, log(1/δ)).
Remark. The only part of the algorithm that interacts with the oracle ReP (or the buyers) is
BunToPrice of the inner layer. Since the BunToPrice only requires a bounded and unbiased
estimate of x∗ψ(p) for each price vector p it queries, we can replace ReP by any procedure that can
compute such unbiased estimate. This is crucial for solving the unit-demand problem.
4 Unit-Demand Buyers with Indivisible Goods
We now switch to the setting of indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers. Our goal is to develop
a computationally and query efficient algorithm to find an approximately optimal distribution over
prices subject to the constraint that the per-round expected demand of each good j is bounded by
sj . In particular, we will use the algorithm OWel in Section 3 as a main tool for our solution.
Throughout, we impose the following mild boundedness assumption on the values.
Assumption on valuations There exists a constant upper bound Vmax such that for any buyer
i ∈ [n] and item j ∈ [d], 0 < vij ≤ Vmax.
Overview: relax and regularize A natural starting point for solving our problem with OWel
is to consider the linear relaxation of unit demand valuations: that is we can view the buyers
as having linear valuation functions over divisible goods, and optimizing over a feasible set of
bundles that is the non-negative orthant of the ℓ1 ball. This relaxation maintains the property
that buyers buy integral quantities of each good. However, this approach runs into a substantial
difficulty, because linear valuation functions are not strongly concave, and strong concavity was
an important ingredient in our analysis of OWel. Instead, we will imagine that we have access
to a regularized version of the linear relaxation of our original problem: that is, we imagine that
each buyer has a regularized valuation function of the form 〈v,x〉+ηH(x), where H is the entropy
function (of course, in reality, we cannot modify the valuations of the buyers). We show that
we can solve the (imagined) regularized version of the problem, and also that we can induce
buyers to behave (in expectation) as if their valuation functions were regularized by appropriately
perturbing the price vectors we present to them. Our solution then consists of the following three
steps:
1. We show that the algorithm OWel can compute an approximately optimal price vector for
the regularized version of problem, as long as the algorithm has access to an unbiased esti-
mate of the expected demand of a random regularized buyer.
2. Next, we show that we can obtain such unbiased estimates given access to the revealed
preference oracle ReP(ψ) in the original un-regularized instance. The key ingredient is a
novel price perturbation technique.
3. Finally, we show how to construct an approximately optimal price distribution based on the
price vector output by OWel.
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To facilitate the discussion, we will introduce a dummy good (indexed as (d + 1)) to represent
the buyer’s option of buying nothing. The seller’s price and each buyer’s value for this item is
always 0, and the per-round demand upper bound is simply sd+1 = 1. Moreover, we will write
∆d+1 to denote the set of all probability distributions over the (d +1) items (or simply the simplex
over the items). For any x ∈ ∆d+1, the entropy of x is defined as H(x) =
∑
j∈[d+1] xj log
1
xj
. The
function H is strongly concave with respect to the ℓ1 norm over the simplex.
4.1 Solving the regularized problem
Given a probability distributionψ over value vectors and a parameter η, we imagine a correspond-
ing η-regularized problem with a distribution ψ˜ over valuation functions: for each valuation vec-
tor vi in the support of ψ, create a regularized valuation function v˜i : ∆d+1 → R>0 with the same
probability mass ψ˜vi = ψvi such that v˜i(x) = 〈vi ,x〉+ ηH(x).
The regularized problem is an instance of the divisible good setting, with feasible set F = ∆d+1.
Suppose that we have access to an unbiased estimate for x∗
ψ˜
(p) for any price vector p: then we can
apply OWel from Section 3 to compute approximately optimal prices. There is a small obstacle
in the analysis—the regularized valuations defined above are not monotonically increasing in
each coordinate (because of the entropy term). However, recall that we were able to substitute
monotonicity for Assumption 3.4— that the convex program SCP(xˆ) is supply-saturating for each
xˆ in our feasible region F = ∆d+1. This is indeed satisfied in our setting:
Lemma 4.1. Let F = ∆d+1 and ψ˜ be a distribution over the regularized valuation functions of the form
[〈v,x〉+ ηH(x)]. Then the convex program SCP(xˆ) defined as
max
x∈∆nd+1
∑
vi∈V
ψ˜(vi) [〈vi ,xi〉+ ηH(xi )] such that
∑
vi∈V
ψ˜(vi)xij ≤ xˆj for every j ∈ [d +1]
is supply-saturating for any xˆ ∈ ∆d+1.
Proof. Let x• be an optimal solution to SCP(xˆ). The convex combination Eψ˜
[
x•i
]
∈ ∆d+1, so we must
have
∑
j∈[d+1]Eψ˜
[
x•ij
]
= 1. Note that xˆ also lies in∆d+1 (these are the only inducible average bundles
for unit demand buyers), so
∑
j∈[d+1] xˆj = 1. It follows that all of the constraints Eψ˜
[
x•ij
]
≤ xˆj are
saturated.
Moreover, the feasible set ∆d+1 is convex, closed, has a non-empty interior, and each of the reg-
ularized valuations is η-strongly concave with respect to the ℓ2 norm,
11 and ((
√
d +1+Vmax,1/2)-
Ho¨lder continuous (see Corollary D.2for a proof). Thus we satisfy all conditions needed to apply
OWel, so long as we have access to unbiased estimates of x∗
ψ˜
(p) for any price vector p ∈ Rd+1+ .
4.2 From price perturbation to value regularization
Solving the regularized problem usingOWel requires an unbiased estimate for xψ˜(p) for any price
vector p that the algorithm queries, but in our problem instance the valuations are actually drawn
from ψ (without the entropy term). To obtain such an estimate, we give a price perturbation
technique that allows us to simulate the response for the regularized buyers: given any price
11This follows from the fact that the ℓ1 norm of any vector is bigger than its ℓ2 norm.
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vector p, we will perturb each coordinate to obtain a noisy price vector p′, with the effect that the
random item purchased by the unit-demand buyer in expectation over the perturbation equals
the bundle purchased by her regularized counterpart.12
Lemma 4.2 (Warmuth (2009)). Fix any η > 0 and any vector u ∈ Rd+1>0 . For each j ∈ [d + 1], let Gj be
a random number drawn independently and uniformly at random from [0,1], then
x∗ = argmax
x∈∆d+1
[〈u,x〉+ ηH(x)] = E
argmaxx∈∆d+1
〈u,x〉+ η
∑
j∈[d+1]
xj ln
(
ln(1/Gj )
)
 .
The random variable lnln(Gj ) is distributed according to the Gumbel distribution. One im-
mediate technical issue we have is that the Gumbel distribution is unbounded, so the perturbed
prices might be negative. We also need to guarantee that the price on the dummy good ⊥ is 0. To
overcome this issue, we will translate the perturbed price vector p into a non-negative price vector
p′ with the following procedure: set p′d+1 = 0 and p
′
j = (pj − pd+1)−min{0,minj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1)}. We
will refer to this procedure as Convert, and show that the choice made by any unit-demand buyer
remains the same under the new price vector p′.
Lemma 4.3. Let p ∈ Rd+1 any real-valued vector and let p′ = Convert(p). Then for any vector v ∈ Rd+1>0
such that vd+1 = 0,
argmax
j∈[d+1]
[vj − pj ] = argmax
j∈[d+1]
[vj − p′j ]
Furthermore, p′j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [d].
Combining the Gumbel noise addition and the procedure Convert, we can now obtain un-
biased estimates for x∗
ψ˜
(p) using feedback from ReP(ψ), the revealed preference oracle for the
original problem instance. More formally, for any fixed price vector p, consider the following
distribution D(p) of random prices:
1. For each j ∈ [d + 1], let Gj be a random number drawn independently and uniformly at
random from [0,1], and let p˜j = pj + lnln(Gj ) for each j ∈ [d +1].
2. Output p′ = Convert(p˜).
Given this subroutine for generating randomprices, we have a procedure Sim (presented in Al-
gorithm 1) for obtaining an unbiased estimate of x∗
ψ˜
(p) for any price vector p. We will establish
the correctness of Sim in Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.4. Fix any price vector p ∈ Rd+1+ , parameter η > 0, and any distribution ψ over value vectors
in Rd+1>0 . Let x
′ be the estimate output by Sim(p,η), then Eψ,Sim [x′] = x∗v˜(p).
Using the subroutine Sim to obtain unbiased estimate of x∗
ψ˜
(p) for different price vectors p, we
can now instantiateOWel to solve the η-regularized problem.
12The technique of simulating regularization through perturbation was also used to establish the equivalence be-
tween “Follow the Regularized Leader” and “Follow the Perturbed Leader” (Warmuth, 2009). In our setting, it is
important that we can obtain this effect by perturbing the price vector, rather than the valuation vector, because we do
not have control over buyer valuations.
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Algorithm 1 Simulate the response of a regularized buyer Sim(p,η)
Input: A price vector p and regularization parameter η
Let p′ a price vector drawn from D(p)
Query the oracle ReP(ψ) with p′ (i.e. post p′ to a random consumer) and obtain feedback x′
Output: x′ as an unbiased estimate for x∗
ψ˜
(p)
4.3 Wrap-up: An approximately optimal distribution over prices
Let pˆ be the price vector output by OWel when solving the η-regularized problem, and consider
the distribution over prices Dˆ =D(pˆ). Similar to the divisible goods setting, we will again compare
to the optimal lottery over allocations. In particular, the optimal lottery is given by
max
x∈∆nd+1
∑
i∈[n]
ψ(vi)[〈vi − c,xi〉] such that
∑
i∈[n]
ψ(vi)xij ≤ sj for each j ∈ [d +1]
Let x⋆ and OPTlot be the optimal solution and value for the program defined above. Since any
distribution of prices is just inducing a lottery over allocations, we know that
max
D s.t. x∗ψ (D)≤s
SW(D) ≤OPTlot
where we write x∗ψ(D) = Ep∼D,v∼ψ [x∗v(p)] to denote expected demand over the goods.
The following lemma bounds the sub-optimality of Dˆ compared to OPTlot in terms of the
regularization parameter η and accuracy guarantee of the price vector pˆ.
Lemma 4.5. Fix any regularization parameter η. Suppose that pˆ is an ε-approximately optimal price
vector for the η-regularized problem. Then the distribution of prices Dˆ =D(pˆ) satisfies
SW(Dˆ) ≥OPTlot − ε − η log(d +1).
Therefore, to achieve a target accuracy of α, it suffices to instantiate OWel with accuracy pa-
rameter ε = α/2 to solve the η-regularized problem with η = α/(2 log(d+1)). Putting all the pieces
together, we have our algorithm OWel-UD (formally presented in Algorithm 4) that achieves the
following main result, which recovers Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 4.6. For any accuracy parameter α > 0, confidence parameter δ > 0, and subset S = {x ∈
F | xj ≤ sj for each j ∈ [d]} given by a supply vector s. Given query access to ReP, the instantiation
OWel-UD(α,δ,s) outputs a distribution Dˆ over prices such that with probability at least 1− δ satisfies
x∗ψ(Dˆ) ≤ s and
SW(Dˆ) ≥OPTlot −α.
Furthermore, both the run-time of the algorithm and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by
poly(d,1/α,Vmax, log(1/δ)).
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5 Limited Supply: Proof of Theorem 1.3
We turn our attention to dynamic pricing with limited supply, so as to prove Theorem 1.3.
Setting and notation. Compared to the main model described in Section 2, the limited supply
setting differs in the following ways. A problem instance is characterized by a pair (s,T ), where
s ∈ Rd+ is the supply vector and T is the time horizon (the maximal number of rounds). Initially
the seller has T · sj units of each good j. For ease of exposition, assume that at most one unit of
each good can be sold in each round. Execution halts when the time horizon is exceeded, or when
the remaining supply of any one good falls below 0. Performance of a given pricing policy π is
characterized by its expected total welfare (over the entire execution), denoted SWtot(π).
We are particularly interested in “fixed-vector” pricing policies: ones that always uses the
same fixed price vector p. The expected total welfare of such policy is denoted SWtot(p). Likewise,
“fixed-distribution” pricing policies always draw the price vector independently from the same
fixed distribution D; the expected total welfare of such policy is denoted SWtot(D).
The induced bundle for a given price vector p is a vector x = x(p) ∈ Rd+ such that xj is the per-
round expected consumption of each product j if price p is chosen. A bundle x ∈ Rd+ is inducible if
x = x(p) for some price vector p.
Connection to “Bandits withKnapsacks”. We represent our problem as a special case of “Bandits
with Knapsacks” (Badanidiyuru et al., 2013), a general setting for multi-armed bandit problems
with resource consumption (henceforth denoted BwK). In BwK, there are several resources con-
sumed by an algorithm, with a limited supply of each. In each round an algorithm chooses from
a fixed set of ‘arms’, receives a reward and consumes some resources. Thus, the outcome from
choosing an arm is a vector (outcome vector) which consists of the reward and the consumption
of all resources. The outcome vector is assumed to be an independent draw of some fixed but
unknown distribution that depends only on the chosen arm.
Dynamic pricing with limited supply is a canonical special case of BwK: arms correspond to
price vectors, resources correspond to the goods (one resource for each good), and rewards is the
seller’s utility from a given customer (typically revenue or profit, in our case — welfare). The
outcome in a given round is determined by the purchased bundle.
5.1 Divisible goods: proof of Theorem 1.3(a)
We use a different, non-standard connection to BwK: arms correspond to inducible bundles, rather
than price vectors. More precisely, for each inducible bundle x we have an arm in BwK such that
choosing this arm means choosing a particular price vector px that induces bundle x. Henceforth,
such an arm is termed arm-bundle x. The reward and resource consumption from choosing this
arm-bundle are defined as those from choosing px. Note that the expected consumption of each
good j is simply xj . An algorithm π for such an instance of BwK, i.e., an algorithm that in each
round selects an inducible bundle and observes the purchased bundle, will be called a bundling
policy. Its expected total welfare is denoted SWtot(π). A “fixed-bundle” bundling policy chooses
some arm-bundle x in each round. Its expected total welfare is denoted as SWtot(x).
Recall that choosing an arm-bundle x determines the realized bundles purchased by each type
of buyers. (It is a consequence of Lemma 3.7.) In other words, the realized bundles do not depend
on the choice of px. Therefore:
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Claim 5.1. Fix a problem instance. For any pricing policy π′, there exists a bundling policy π with the
same expected total welfare.
Proof. The bundling policy π is constructed as follows: whenever π′ chooses a price vector p that
induces bundle x, π chooses arm-bundle x. Then π and π′ have the same distribution over the
outcome vectors in each round t (this is proved by induction on t).
The analysis in Badanidiyuru et al. (2013) emphasizes “fixed-distribution” bundling policies:
where in each round the arm-bundle is sampled independently from a fixed distribution D over
arm-bundles. Let SWtot(D) and SW(D) denote, resp., the expected total welfare and the expected
per-round welfare from this bundling policy. A structural result from Badanidiyuru et al. (2013),
as specialized to our setting, essentially reduces optimization over arbitrary bundling policies to
that over fixed-distribution bundling policies:
Lemma 5.2 (specialized from Badanidiyuru et al. (2013)). Fix a finite set B of arm-bundles. Let
supSW
tot
(B) be the supremum of expected total welfare achieved by bundling policies that can only
use arm-bundles from B. There exists a distribution D over B such that T · SW(D) ≥ supSW
tot
(B) and
xj (D) ≤ sj for each good j.
Here T · SW(D) is seen as an approximation for SWtot(D), given that xj (D) ≤ sj for each j.
Reduction to best fixed bundle. A distribution D over arm-bundles can be replaced by arm-
bundle x = Ex∼D [x], in the sense that SW(x) ≥ SW(D) (because is concave in the expected bundle,
see Lemma 3.8), and xj (D) = xj for each good j.
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Let supSW
tot
be the supremum of expected total welfare over all bundling policies π. By
Claim 5.1, it is also the supremum of expected total welfare over all pricing policies.
We claim that for any given ε > 0 there exists a finite set B of arm-bundles such that
supSW
tot
(B) ≥ supSW
tot
− ε.
This holds because SW(x) is a Ho¨lder-continuous function of bundle x (see Lemma C.2), and so for
any ε, there is a fine enough discretization of bundles that yields an ε-net for social welfare.
Putting this together, we reduce arbitrary bundling policies to fixed-bundle policies:
Corollary 5.3. For each ε > 0 there exists is an arm-bundle x such that
T · SW(x) ≥ supSW
tot
− ε and xj ≤ sj for each good j.
Again, T · SW(x) is seen as an approximation for SWtot(x), given that xj ≤ sj for each j.
Completing the proof. Fix parameter α > 0. Applying Corollary 5.3 with ε = αT /2 and letting p
be a price vector that induces bundle x, we obtain a price vector p such that
T · SW(p) ≥ supSW
tot
−αT /2 and xj (p) ≤ sj for each good j.
The algorithm from Theorem 1.1 can compute a price vector p∗ such that
SW(p∗) ≥ SW(p)−α/2 and xj (p∗) ≤ sj for each good j.
In particular, T · SW(p∗) ≥ supSW
tot
−αT . It remains to bound the difference between the expected
total welfare SWtot(p
∗) and the estimate T · SW(p∗):
13A similar statement — that any distribution over arms is “dominated” by some arm — is false for many other
special cases of BwK, including another version of dynamic pricing with limited supply (Badanidiyuru et al., 2013).
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Lemma 5.4. Let smin =minj sj and assume that T smin > 32 logT . Then
SWtot(p
∗) ≥ T · SW(p∗)−O(
√
T log(T )/smin).
(The lemma applies to all price vectors p∗ such that xj (p∗) ≤ sj for each good j. Its proof is
deferred to Section 5.3.) Putting this all together, we see that
SWtot(p
∗) ≥ supSW
tot
−αT −O(
√
T log(T )/smin).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.3.
5.2 Indivisible goods and unit demands: proof sketch of of Theorem 1.3(b)
Recall that we compete against a weaker benchmark: the best fixed distribution D over the price
vectors; more precisely, against supSW
tot
:= supD: x(D)≤s SWtot(D).
We can bound the deviation between SWtot(D) and T ·SW(D) via the following lemma (which is
stated and proved similarly to Lemma 5.4).
Lemma 5.5. Let smin = minj sj and assume that T smin > 32 logT . Let D be a distribution over price
vectors such that x(D) ≤ s. Then:
|SWtot(D)−T · SW(D)| ≤O(
√
T log(T )/smin).
Fix ε > 0 and choose some distribution D such that x(D) ≤ s and SWtot(D) ≥ supSWtot − ε.
Apply Theorem 1.3 to construct a distribution D∗ such that x(D∗) ≤ s and SW(D∗) ≥ SW(D)− α. By
Lemma 5.5, it follows that
SWtot(D)− SWtot(D∗) ≤ T (SW(D)− SW(D∗)) +O(
√
T log(T )/smin)
≤ αT +O(
√
T log(T )/smin).
5.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Let π denote the the fixed-price policy with price vector p∗. For the sake of the argument, let
us consider the execution of π in the problem instance I with time horizon T , but without the
supply constraint. Let Zt be the realized total welfare of this execution by time t. Without loss
of generality, we view an execution of π in the original problem instance as an execution in the
unlimited-supply instance, truncated at round τ when the original problem instance would halt.
Thus, the total realized welfare of π in the original problem instance is Zτ , where τ is a stopping
time.
Let xj = xj (p
∗) be the expected consumption of a given good j. Let yj,t be the realized total
consumption of this good by time t. Let w = SW(p∗) be the expected per-round welfare for p∗. By
Chernoff Bound, letting c0 =
√
8 logT , with probability at least 1−T −2 we have
|yj,t − txj | ≤ c0
√
txj and Zt ≥ wt − c0
√
t for each good j and all rounds t ≤ T . (12)
An execution of π on unlimited-supply problem instance I is called clean if the event in
eq. (12) holds. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show in clean execution,
Zτ ≥ T · SW(p∗)−O(
√
T log(T )/smin). (13)
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So we will assume a clean execution from now on.
Let Bj = sj T be the supply for good j. The stopping time τ can be expressed as
τ = min
goods j
min(T ,τj ), where τj =min
{
rounds t : yj,t > Bj
}
. (14)
Informally, we can think of each τj as the stopping time for good j. Let us analyze τj .
Claim 5.6. τj ≥
B−c0
√
Bj
xj
, for each good j.
Proof. Let ε = c0
√
Bj /xj . It suffices to prove that for each round t ≤ Bj /xj −ε we have yj,t ≤ Bj . This
is so because by eq. (12) we have yj,t ≤ txj + c0
√
txj ≤ Bj − εxj + c0
√
Bj ≤ Bj .
Claim 5.7. min(T ,τj ) ≥ T − 2c0
√
T /sj , for each good j.
Proof. If T ≤ B−c0
√
Bj
xj
, then the claim follows trivially by Claim 5.6. Else, we have
T ≥ B− c0
√
Bj
xj
≥ Bj
2xj
, so τj ≥ T −
c0Bj
xj
≥ T − 2c0T /
√
Bj = T − 2c0
√
T /sj .
Plugging this into eq. (14), it follows that τ ≥ T −2c0
√
T /smin. Since Zτ ≥ wτ− c0
√
τ by eq. (12),
the lower bound on τ implies eq. (13). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.
6 Conclusions and open questions
We provide a polynomial time dynamic pricing algorithm for maximizing welfare over the alloca-
tion of d goods, for buyers satisfying reasonable assumptions on their valuation functions. Prior
work either required explicit assumptions on the aggregate price response function unsupported
by micro-economic foundations, or had running time exponential in d.
Let us highlight two interesting directions. First: give an algorithm with a more reasonable
polynomial run time. While we achieve polynomial dependence on d and α, this is mainly a
proof of concept result: the degree of the polynomial run-time of our algorithm is quite high.
A (much) smaller degree is desirable, but appears beyond the reach of our current techniques.
Are there practical algorithms that achieve the same guarantees? Second: extend our results
to revenue optimization, a more traditional objective in the dynamic pricing literature. With
our current techniques, this extension requires a major assumption on valuations, namely that
buyers’ valuations are uniformly homogeneous with degree m < 1: that there exists a constantm < 1
such that for every buyer i, bundle x, and scalar λ, vi(λx) = λ
mvi(x) (the extension to revenue
maximization subject to this assumption follows from the techniques of Roth et al. (2016)). Can
revenue maximization be handled subject to weaker assumptions?
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A Basic Definitions and Tools
The following condition is useful for obtaining the Slater’s condition and strong duality in convex
program.
Definition A.1 (Non-empty interior). Let C ∈ Rd be a convex set defined by the following set of
constraints:
fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , k
gj (x) ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m
where each fi is a convex function and each gj is an affine function. We say that the set C has a non-
empty interior if there exists a point x∗ ∈ C such that fi(x) < 0 for each i.
Lemma A.2. Let φ : C → R be a σ-strongly convex function, and let x∗ = argminx∈C φ(x) be the
minimizer of φ. Then, for any x ∈ C,
‖x − x∗‖22 ≤
2
σ
· (φ(x)−φ(x∗)).
Similarly, if φ is σ-strongly concave, and x∗ = argmaxx∈C φ(x), then for any x ∈ C,
‖x − x∗‖22 ≤
2
σ
· (φ(x∗)−φ(x)).
Theorem A.3 (Real-valued Additive Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xm be i.i.d. random
variables with E [Xi] = µ and a ≤ Xi ≤ b for all i. Then for every α > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
∑
iXi
m
−µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ α
]
≤ 2exp
(−2α2m
(b − a)2
)
.
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B Proof for Noisy Gradient Descent
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that f is convex, fix constants D,E, and G. Suppose that the gradient descent
algorithm performs the following update in each iteration
yt+1 = xt − η gt and xt+1 =ΠC(yt+1) + ξt
such that gt ∈ ∂f (xt) and ξt ∈ Rd is a noise vector. Suppose that ‖gt‖ ≤ G and ‖ξt‖ ≤ E, xt ∈ C for all
steps t, and the diameter of the set satisfies ‖C‖ ≤ D. Then if we run the subgradient descent method
with step size η =D/(G
√
T ), for any T and any initial point x1 ∈ C, the point z = 1T
∑T
t=1xt satisfies
f (z) ≤min
x∈C
f (x) +DG/
√
T +GE
√
T .
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ argminx∈C c(x). For each time step t, we will write xˆt+1 =ΠC (yt+1). Using the basic
property of convexity and the elementary identity 2〈a,b〉 = ‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 −‖a− b‖2, we can derive the
following
c(xt)− c(x∗) ≤ 〈gt ,xt − x∗〉
=
1
η
〈
(xt − yt+1), (xt − x∗)
〉
=
1
2η
(
‖xt − yt+1‖2 + ‖xt − x∗‖2 − ‖yt+1 − x∗‖2
)
=
1
2η
(
‖xt − x∗‖2 − ‖yt+1 − x∗‖2
)
+
η
2
‖gt‖2
Since x∗ ∈ C, by the property of the projection mapping Π, we know that
‖yt+1 − x∗‖2 ≥ ‖ΠC(yt+1)− x∗‖2 = ‖xt+1 − x∗ + xˆt+1 − xt+1‖2 ≥ ‖xt+1 − x∗‖2 − 2E‖xt+1 − x∗‖
Since the set C has diameter bounded by D, it follows that
c(xt)− c(x∗) ≤
1
2η
(
‖xt − x∗‖2 − ‖xt+1 − x∗‖2 +2E‖xt+1 − x∗‖
)
+
η
2
‖gt‖2
≤ 1
2η
(
‖xt − x∗‖2 − ‖xt+1 − x∗‖2
)
+
ηG2
2
+
DE
η
Also note that ‖gt‖ ≤ G, then summing over the resulting inequality over all time steps s yields
T∑
t=1
(c(xt)− c(x∗)) ≤
D2
2η
+
ηG2
2
+
DE
η
Therefore, if we set the step size η =D/(G
√
T ), we get the following guarantee using convexity
c(z) ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
c(xt) ≤DG/
√
T +GE
√
T ,
which recovers our claim.
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C Missing Details and Proofs of Section 3
Lemma 3.7. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be a bundle, and let pˆ ∈ Rd+ be a price vector such that x∗ψ(pˆ) = xˆ. Then
• the price vector pˆ is an optimal dual solution for SCP(xˆ), and
• the vector x• ∈ F n such that x•i = x∗vi (pˆ) for each i is the unique optimal primal solution.
Proof. First, we will show that gxˆ(pˆ) = minp∈Rd+ gxˆ(p) = VAL(xˆ). Note that
gxˆ(pˆ) = max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x, pˆ) = max
x∈F n
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(xi )−
d∑
j=1
pˆj

∑
vi∈V
ψ(vi)xij − xˆj

=max
x∈F n
∑
i
ψ(vi)
(
vi(xi )− 〈pˆj ,xi〉+ 〈pˆ, xˆ〉
)
By eq. (9), we have x•i = argmaxxi∈F [vi(xi )− 〈pˆ,xi〉+ 〈pˆ, xˆ〉]. This means gxˆ(pˆ) = Lxˆ(x•, pˆ). Since for
each j ∈ [d], we have∑i ψ(vi)x•ij = xˆj , we get
gxˆ(pˆ) = Lxˆ(x•, pˆ) =
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
•
i ) ≤ VAL(xˆ)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that x• is a feasible solution to the program SCP(xˆ).
Therefore, wemust have g(pˆ) = VAL(xˆ), and so pˆ is an optimal dual solution to the convex program.
Since pˆ is the optimal dual solution, it follows from eq. (9) that x• is the optimal primal solution.
Finally, the uniqueness of the primal solution follows from the fact that the objective in eq. (4) is
strongly concave.
Claim C.1. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be an inducible bundle, induced by price vector pˆ. Then SW(pˆ) = SW(xˆ).
Proof. For each i, let x•i (xˆ) be the allocation to buyer i in the convex program SCP(xˆ). By Lemma 3.7,
we know that x•i (xˆ) = x
∗
vi
(pˆ), and also VAL(xˆ) = Evi∼ψ
[
v(x•i (xˆ))
]
. By linearity of expectation,
SW(pˆ) = E
vi∼ψ
[
v(x•i (xˆ))− 〈c,x•i 〉
]
= VAL(xˆ)− 〈c, xˆ〉,
which recovers our claim.
Lemma 3.8. The expected social welfare function SW : F → R as defined in eq. (10) is concave.
Proof. Let xˆ, yˆ ∈ F , and let zˆ = (xˆ + yˆ)/2. It suffices to show that
SW(zˆ) ≥ SW(xˆ) + SW(yˆ)
2
.
Now for each vi ∈ V , let x•i , y•i , z•i be the bundles assigned to buyer i in the optimal solutions of
the convex programs SCP(xˆ), SCP(yˆ) and SCP(zˆ). Furthermore, let r•i = (x
•
i + y
•
i )/2. Observe that the
assignment r• is also a feasible solution for the convex program SCP(zˆ), so by the optimality of z•,
we have
E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(z
•
i )
]
≥ E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(r
•
i )
]
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By the definition of SW and VAL, we have
SW(xˆ) = E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(x
•
i )
]
− 〈c, xˆ〉, and SW(yˆ) = E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(y
•
i )
]
− 〈c, yˆ〉.
It follows that
SW(xˆ) + SW(yˆ) = E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(x
•
i )
]
− 〈c, xˆ〉+ E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(y
•
i )
]
− 〈c, yˆ〉
= E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(x
•
i )
]
+ E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(y
•
i )
]
− 2〈c, zˆ〉
(by concavity of vi) ≤ 2 E
vi∼ψ
[
vi(r
•
i )
]
− 2〈c, zˆ〉 = 2SW(zˆ)
which completes our proof.
We can translate the Ho¨lder continuity condition on the valuation functions in class V to a
Ho¨lder continuity condition of the function VAL and SW, which will be useful for our analysis
later.
Lemma C.2. VAL : F → R as defined in eq. (10) is (d1−βλ,β)-Ho¨lder continuous w.r.t. the ℓ1 norm.
Proof. Let two bundles xˆ, yˆ ∈ F be such that xˆj = yˆj + ∆ and xˆj ′ = yˆj ′ . We will first show that
VAL(xˆ)− VAL(yˆ) ≤ λ‖xˆ − yˆ‖β2 = ∆β .
For each i, let x•i and y
•
i be the assigned bundles to buyer i in SCP(xˆ) and SCP(yˆ) respec-
tively. By our assumption, we know
∑
i ψ(vi)x
•
i = yˆj + ∆. Then there exists δ1, . . . ,δn ∈ R+ such
that
∑n
i=1ψ(vi)δi = ∆ and x
•
ij ≥ δi . Now consider a vector x′ ∈ F nd such that for each i,
x′ij = x
•
ij − δi ≥ 0 and x′ij ′ = x•ij ′ for each j ′ , j.
Note that x′ is a feasible solution to the convex program SCP(yˆ), so we have
∑
i ψ(vi)vi(x
′
i ) ≤ VAL(yˆ).
Furthermore, ∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
′
i ) =
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
′
i )− (VAL(xˆ)− VAL(xˆ))
≥ VAL(xˆ)−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣VAL(xˆ)−
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
′
i )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= VAL(xˆ)−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ψ(vi)(vi(x
•
i )− vi(x′i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Ho¨lder continuity of vi) ≥ VAL(xˆ)−λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ψ(vi)δ
β
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(Jensen’s inequality) ≥ VAL(xˆ)−λ

∑
i
ψ(vi)δi

β
= VAL(xˆ)−λ∆β
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Therefore, we have shown that the values of VAL on any two bundles xˆ and yˆ that differ by one
coordinate satisfy Ho¨lder continuity condition. To show this condition for any two bundles x,y ∈(
F ⋂Rd>0), we can apply the same argument iteratively. First, we can form a set of (d +1) bundles
b0 = x,b1, . . . ,bd = y such that bundles bj and bj+1 differ by at most one coordinate, and
d∑
r=1
‖br − br−1‖1 = ‖x − y‖1
Let ∆r = ‖br − br+1‖1 for each r, we can then write
|VAL(x)− VAL(y)| ≤
d−1∑
r=0
|VAL(br)− VAL(br+1)|
≤ λ
d−1∑
r=0
∆
β
r ≤ λd
1d
d−1∑
r=0
∆r

β
= d1−βλ‖x − y‖β1
where the last inequality follows from applying Jensen’s inequality.
C.1 Section 3.2
Lemma 3.9. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
. There exists a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈F n
min
p∈P (ε)
Lxˆ(x,p) = min
p∈P (ε)
max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x,p) = R-OPT
Moreover, VAL(xˆ) ≤ R-OPT ≤ VAL(xˆ) + ε2σ4 .
Proof. Since both F n and P (ε) are convex and P (ε) is compact, by Sion’s minimax theorem Sion
(1958), there is a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈F n
min
p∈P (ε)
Lxˆ(x,p) = min
p∈P (ε)
max
x∈F n
Lxˆ(x,p) = R-OPT (15)
Since P (ε) ⊆ Rd+, wemust have R-OPT ≥ VAL(xˆ). Nowwe only need to show that R-OPT ≤ VAL(xˆ)+α
with α = ε2σ/4. Let (x⋆ ,p⋆) be a pair of minimax strategies of eq. (15). That is
x⋆ ∈ argmax
x∈F n
min
p∈P (ε)
L(x,p) and p⋆ ∈ argmin
p∈P (ε)
max
x∈F n
L(x,p)
It suffices to show that L(x⋆ ,p⋆) ≤ VAL(xˆ) +α. Suppose not, then we have
VAL(xˆ) +α < min
p∈P (ε)
L(x⋆ ,p)
=
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
⋆
i )− max
p∈P (ε)
∑
j∈[d]

∑
i
ψ(vi)x
⋆
ij − xˆ
pj
≤
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
⋆
i )
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Now consider the bundle y such that yj = max{
∑
i ψ(vi)x
⋆
ij , xˆj }. For each i, let y•i = x∗vi (p∗(y))
and x•i = x
∗
vi
(p∗(xˆ)). By definition, VAL(y) =
∑
i ψ(vi)vi(y
•
i ). It is clear that
VAL(y) ≥
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
⋆
i ) > VAL(xˆ).
Let L = λ1/β
(
4d
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
, then we can construct the following price vector p′ ∈ P (ε) such that p′j = L
for each good j with
∑
i ψ(vi)x
⋆
ij > xˆj , and p
′
j = 0 for all other goods. By Lemma C.2, we can derive
the following
VAL(y)− VAL(xˆ) ≤ d1−βλ‖y − xˆ‖1 (16)
It follows that
VAL(xˆ) +α < L(x⋆ ,p⋆) ≤ L(x⋆ ,p′) (17)
=
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
⋆
i )−
〈
p′,
∑
i
ψ(vi)x
⋆
i − xˆ
〉
(18)
=
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
⋆
i )−
∑
j :yj>xˆj
L (yj − xˆj ) (19)
≤ VAL(y)− L‖y − xˆ‖1 (20)
By combining eqs. (16) and (20), we obtain
α < d1−βλ‖y − xˆ‖β1 − L‖y − xˆ‖1 = λ‖y − xˆ‖
β
1
(
d1−β − L
λ
‖y − xˆ‖(1−β)1
)
Since α > 0, we know that ‖y − xˆ‖1 < d
(
λ
L
)1/(1−β)
. By our setting of L,
α < dλ
(
λ
L
)β/(1−β)
=
ε2σ
4
= α
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the minimax value R-OPT is no more than VAL(xˆ) +α.
Lemma 3.10. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
and p′ be a price vector in P (ε) such that gxˆ(p′) ≤minp∈P (ε) gxˆ(p) +α
for some α > 0. Let x′ = x∗ψ(p
′) be the expected bundle induced by prices p′. Then ‖x′ − xˆ‖2 ≤ 2
√
α/σ.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, we know that VAL(xˆ) = minp∈Rd+ gxˆ(p). We will abuse notation to write x
′
i =
x∗vi (p
′) for each buyer of type i. By the result of Lemma 3.9, we also have
gxˆ(p
′) = L(x′ ,p′) ≤ R-OPT+α ≤ VAL(xˆ) + 2α.
For each i, let x•i = x
•
vi
(xˆ). Then note that L(x•,p′) = VAL(xˆ)− 〈p′, xˆ − xˆ〉 = VAL(xˆ). Moreover, x′ is the
maximizer for L(·,p′), so it follows that
0 ≤ L(x′ ,p′)−L(x•,p′) ≤ 2α. (21)
For each buyer of type i, any bundle and price vector p, we will write ui(x,p) = vi(x)− 〈p,x〉 to
denote the quasilinear utility function of buyer i. By our assumption on the valuation functions
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in V , we know that ui(·,p) is a σ-strongly concave function over the space W for any price vector
p. We know from eq. (21) that
L(x′ ,p′)−L(x•,p′) =
∑
i
ψ(vi)[ui(x
′
i ,p
′)− ui(x•i ,p′)] ≤ 2α.
Since for each type i, the bundles x′i and x
•
i lie in the setW , we have the following based on LemmaA.2
σ
2
‖x•i − x′i‖22 ≤ ui(x′i ,p′)− ui(x•i ,p′)
Also, by Jensen’s inequality, we have
‖xˆ − x′‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
ψi(x
•
i − x′i)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤
∑
i
ψi‖x•i − x′i‖22
It follows that
σ
2
‖xˆ − x′‖22 ≤ 2α
and so ‖xˆ − x′‖2 ≤ 2
√
α/σ .
Lemma 3.11. Let p ∈ Rd+ be any price vector, and x∗v(p) be bundle purchased by a buyer with valuation
function v under prices p. Then
E
v∼ψ
[xˆ − x∗v(p)] = xˆ − x∗ψ(p) = ∇gxˆ(p).
Proof. Given x• = argmaxx∈F n L(x,p), we know by the Envelope theorem that the gradient of g can
be obtained as
∂gxˆ(p)
∂pj
= xˆj −
∑
i
ψ(vi)x
•
ij , for each j ∈ [d]. (22)
By the definition of x• we have,
x• = argmax
x∈F n

∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(xi )−
∑
j∈[d]
pj

∑
i
ψ(vi)xij − xˆj


= argmax
x∈F n

∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(xi )−
∑
j∈[d]
pj

∑
i
ψ(vi)xij


= argmax
x∈F n

∑
i
ψ(vi) (vi(xi )− 〈p,xi〉)

Observe that the decision variables xi for each buyer i is independent of all other buyers’ decision
in the argmax expression above. This means
x•i = argmax
xi∈Rd+
[vi(xi )− 〈p,xi〉]
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It follows that for each buyer of type i, the bundle x•i corresponds to her purchased bundle under
prices p, that is x∗vi (p). By combining with eq. (22), we now have that
∇gxˆ(p) = E
v∼ψ
[xˆ − x∗v(p)] = xˆ − x∗ψ(p),
which completes our proof.
Lemma 3.12. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be any target bundle. There exists an algorithm that given any target
accuracy ε and confidence parameter δ as input, outputs a list P of log(1/δ) price vectors such that with
probability at least 1−δ, there exists a price vector pˆ ∈ P that satisfies
∥∥∥∥x∗ψ(pˆ)− xˆ
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ε. Furthermore, the
running time, the length of the list and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly(d,1/ε, log(1/δ)).
Proof. The algorithm will start by running log(1/δ) independent instantiations (indexed by l) of
noisy gradient descent method (Theorem 2.1) to optimize the function gxˆ. We will set number of
iterations T1 and learning rate η to be
T1 =
4096dL2R2
ε4σ2
and η =
R
L
√
dT
with L = λ1/β
(
4d
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
. At each iteration point p by the gradient descent method, we will obtain
an unbiased estimate of the gradient by first posting the prices p, observe the bundle x∗(p) pur-
chased by a random buyer, and then compute the vector (xˆ − x∗(p)) as the estimate. Since both xˆ
and x∗(p) satisfy ‖xˆ‖,‖x∗(p)‖ ≤ R and xˆ,x∗(p) ∈ Rd+, we have
‖xˆ − x∗(p)‖ ≤ R
Furthermore, by our choice of search space P (ε), each iteration point p satisfies ‖p‖ ≤ L
√
d. By the
guarantee of Theorem 2.1, each instantiation of the noisy gradient descent method will output a
price vector p(l) such that
E [gxˆ(p(l))] ≤ min
p∈P ′(ε)
gxˆ(p) +
ε2σ
64
.
By Markov inequality, for each instantiation l,
Pr
[
gxˆ(p(l))− min
p∈P ′(ε)
gxˆ(p) ≥
ε2σ
32
]
≤ 1/2.
Since we have log(1/δ) independent instantiations of the noisy gradient descent method, with
probability at least 1− δ, there exists an instantiation l∗ that outputs a price vector pˆ such that
gxˆ(pˆ)− min
p∈P ′(ε)
gxˆ(p) ≤
ε2σ
32
.
By Lemma 3.10, we have that
‖x∗ψ(pˆ)− xˆ‖ ≤ ε.
The number of rounds of interactions with the buyers is bounded by
O
(
dL2R2 log(1/δ)
ε4σ2
)
,
which recovers our claim.
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Algorithm 2 Learning the price vector to induce a target bundle: BunToPrice(xˆ, ε,δ)
Input: A target bundle xˆ ∈ C, target accuracy ε, and confidence parameter δ
Initialize: restricted price space P (ε) =
{
p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dL
}
where
L = (λ)1/β
(
4d
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
, T0 = log(2/δ), T1 =
16384d L2R2
ε4σ2
, T2 =
4R2 log(16dR2/δ)
ε2
, η =
R
L
√
dT1
For l = 1, . . . ,T1:
Set p1j = 1 for all good j ∈ [d]
For t = 1, . . . ,T0:
Query ReP with pt and observe an unbiased estimate for x∗ψ(p
t)
Update price vector with gradient descent:
pˆt+1j = p
t
j − η
(
xˆj − x∗(pt)j
)
for each j ∈ [d], pt+1 =ΠP (ε)
[
pˆt+1
]
Let p(l) = 1/T
∑T
t=1p
t .
For s = 1, . . . ,T2:
Query ReP and observe an unbiased estimate x(s)for x∗ψ(p
t)
Let x(l) = 1T2
∑T2
s=1 x(s)
Let l∗ = argminl∈[T1] ‖x(l)− xˆ‖
Output: pˆ = p(l∗)
Theorem 3.13. Let xˆ ∈
(
F ∩Rd>0
)
be any target bundle. For any target accuracy parameter ε and
confidence parameter δ, the instantiation BunToPrice(xˆ, ε,δ) outputs a price vector pˆ that with prob-
ability at least 1− δ satisfies ‖xˆ − x∗ψ(pˆ)‖ ≤ ε. Furthermore, the number of queries to ReP is bounded by
poly(d,1/ε, log(1/δ)).
Proof. Wewill first run the subroutine in Lemma 3.12with accuracy parameter ε/4 and confidence
parameter δ/2. This will output a list of log(2/δ) prices P such that with probability at least 1−δ/2,
there exists p∗ ∈ P such that
‖xˆ − x∗ψ(p∗)‖ ≤ ε/4. (23)
For the remainder of the proof, we will condition on this accuracy guarantee, which is the case
except with probability δ/2.
Next, for each of the price vector p ∈ P , we will post the price p and observe purchased bundles
by random buyers under prices p for T2 number of rounds where T2 =
16dR2 log(4d/δ)
ε2
. For each good
j, the amount of good j purchased by a random buyer is a random variable with in the range of
[0,R] by our assumption on the class of valuations V . Let xj be the average amount of j-th good
purchased by these T2 number of buyers. Note that Eψ
[
xj
]
= (x∗ψ(p))j for all good j. By applying
Chernoff bound (Theorem A.3), we have with probability 1− δ/(2d log(2/δ)) that
‖xj − (x∗ψ(p))j‖ ≤
ε
4
√
d
33
By applying a union bound over all price vectors in the set P and all goods j ∈ [d], we have with
probability at least 1− δ/2 that
‖x − x∗ψ(p)‖ ≤
ε
4
(24)
We will condition on this event for the rest of the proof, which is the case except with probability
δ/2. Let x′ be the average bundle for posting the price vector p∗. Applying triangle inequality
on eqs. (23) and (24), we get
‖x′ − xˆ‖ ≤ ε/2. (25)
Finally, we will select the price vector pˆ ∈ P with its average bundle x closest to target bundle xˆ
w.r.t. ℓ2 distance. Based on eq. (25), we must have
‖x − xˆ‖ ≤ ε/2.
By applying triangle inequality on eq. (24), the output price vector must satisfy
‖xˆ − x∗ψ(pˆ)‖ ≤ ε,
which recovers our claim.
C.2 Section 3.3
Lemma 3.14. Let xˆ ∈
(
R
d
>0∩F
)
, and pˆ be the price vector that induces xˆ. Then (pˆ − c) ∈ ∂SW(xˆ).
Proof. First, recall that in eq. (10), SW is defined as
SW(xˆ) = VAL(xˆ)− 〈c, xˆ〉.
It follows that to prove our claim, we just need to show that pˆ ∈ ∂VAL(xˆ). Let yˆ ∈ Rd>0 ∩F . By the
definition of subgradient, it suffices to show that
VAL(xˆ) + 〈pˆ, (yˆ − xˆ)〉 ≥ VAL(yˆ).
Let x• and y• be the optimal solutions for SCP(xˆ) and SCP(yˆ) respectively. This allows us to derive
VAL(xˆ) + 〈pˆ, (yˆ − xˆ)〉 =
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
•
i ) + 〈pˆ, (yˆj − xˆj )
=
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(x
•
i ) +
∑
j
pˆj

∑
i
ψ(vi)(y
•
ij − x•ij )

=
∑
i
ψ(vi)
(
vi(x
•
i )− 〈pˆ,x•〉
)
+
∑
j
pˆj

∑
i
ψ(vi)y
•
ij

Note that for each i, x•i = x
∗
vi
(pˆ) by Lemma 3.7, so we must have for each i
vi(x
•
i )− 〈pˆ,x•i 〉 ≥ vi(y•i )− 〈pˆ,y•i 〉.
It follows that
VAL(xˆ) + 〈pˆ, (yˆ − xˆ)〉 ≥
∑
i
ψ(vi)
vi(y•i )−
∑
j
pˆjy
•
ij
+
∑
j
pˆj

∑
i
ψ(vi)y
•
ij
 =
∑
i
ψ(vi)vi(y
•
i ) = VAL(yˆ),
which recovers our claim.
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Theorem 3.16. For any accuracy parameter α > 0, confidence parameter δ > 0, and subset S = {x ∈
F | xj ≤ sj for each j ∈ [d]} given by a supply vector s. Given query access to ReP, the instantiation
OWel(α,δ,s) outputs a price vector p′ that with probability at least 1− δ satisfies x∗ψ(p′) ≤ s and
SW(p′) ≥OPTlot −α.
Furthermore, both the run-time of the algorithm and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by
poly(d,1/α,1/σ,1/λ, log(1/δ)).
Proof. Let π be an lottery allocation. Let x˜ ∈ F n be an allocation such that each buyer is allocated
the average bundle x˜i = Evi∼ψ [π(i)] in π
⋆ . Since each buyer’s valuation is concave, by Jensen’s
inequality, we have ∑
i
ψ(vi) [vi(x˜i)− 〈c, x˜i〉] ≥ E
vi∼ψ,π
[v(π(i))− c(π(i))] .
In other words, the optimal welfare OPTlot can also be achieved by a deterministic allocation.
Moreover, the optimal welfare by a deterministic allocation is maxx∈S SW(x). Therefore, we only
need to bound the difference between the welfare of the resulting price vector and maxx∈S SW(x).
To do that, we will need to bound three different types of error, and show that they add up to
at most α with probability at least 1− β. Before we proceed into analyzing each type of error, we
condition on the event that all (T + 1) instantiations of BunToPrice achieve their target accuracy
guarantees. Since each of them has confidence parameter δ, by union bound, we know this is the
case except with probability (T +1)δ′ = δ.
First, we will show that the bundle x computed by the noisy subgradient descent method
satisfies
SW(x) ≥max
x∈Sξ
SW(x)−α/2. (26)
Observe that the perturbation error in our subgradient descent is precisely the inducing error of
BunToPrice, which is bounded by ε. By Theorem 2.2 and our settings of T ,η and ε (in Algo-
rithm 3), we recover the bound in eq. (26).
Next, since are not optimizing over the entire set S , we need to bound the loss in welfare for
only optimizing over Sξ . The result of Lemma 3.15 can be applied, and by our choice of ξ we get
max
x∈S
SW(x)−max
x′∈Sξ
SW(x′) ≤ α/4.
It follows that
SW(x) ≥max
x∈Sξ
SW(x)−α/2 ≥max
x′∈S
SW(x′)− 3α/4. (27)
Finally, in our last instantiation of BunToPrice, we will learn a price vector pˆ induce a bundle
xˆ that is close to x, that is ‖xˆ−x‖ ≤ ε. Given our choice of ε, we can bound the difference in welfare
as in the analysis of Lemma 3.15 to get
SW(pˆ) = SW(xˆ) ≥ SW(xˆ)−α/4. (28)
By combining eqs. (26) to (28), we have obtained
SW(pˆ) ≥max
x∈S
SW(x)−α.
Note that OWel only interacts with the buyers through BunToPrice, and each instantiation re-
quires no more than poly(d,1/α, log(1/δ)) rounds of interactions with the buyers.
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Algorithm 3 Learning the price vector to optimize social welfare: OWel(α,δ,s)
Input: Target accuracy α, confidence parameter δ, and per-round expected demand bound s
Initialize:
ε =
(
α2
16RS2
)β/(5β−4)
, M =
√
d(λ)1/β (4d/σ)(1−β)/β
T =
16R2M2
α2ε(2−2β)/β
, η =
R√
TM(1/ε)(2−2β)/β
, δ′ = δ/(T +1), ξ =
(
α
4λdβ +
√
d‖c‖
)1/β
Restricted bundle space Sξ , initial bundle x
1 ∈ Sξ and prices p1 = BunToPrice(x1, ε,δ′)
For t = 1, . . . ,T :
Let y(t+1) =ΠSξ [x
t + η(pt − c)]
Let pt+1 = BunToPrice(xt+1, ε)
Let x = 1/T
∑T
t=1 x
t
Output: the last price vector pˆ = BunToPrice(x,γ,δ′)
D Missing Details in Section 4
Lemma D.1. The entropy function H(x) =
∑N
j=1xi log(1/xi) is (
√
N,1/2)-Ho¨lder continuous w.r.t. ℓ1-
norm over the simplex.
Proof. We will first show that the function f (t) = t log(1/t) is Ho¨lder continuous. The first-order
derivative of the function is f ′(t) = log(1/t)− 1.
For any pair a,b ∈ [0,1], we can write
|f (a)− f (b)| ≤
∫ b
a
|f ′(t)|dt ≤
(∫ b
a
|f ′(t)|2 dt
)1/2
·
(∫ b
a
12dt
)1/2
where the last inequality follows from Ho¨lder inequality. Moreover,
∫ b
a
|f ′(t)|2 dt ≤
∫ 1
0
|f ′(t)|2 dt = 1 and
∫ b
a
12 dt = |a− b|
It follows that
|f (a)− f (b)| ≤ |a− b|1/2
Therefore, the function f is (1,1/2)-Ho¨lder continuous.
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Now we will use this to show the Ho¨lder continuity of the entropy function. Let x,y be two
probability vectors in N-dimensional space, and δj = |xi − yi |, then
|H(x)−H(y)| ≤
N∑
j=1
|f (xj )− f (yj )|
≤
N∑
j=1
|xj − yj |1/2
=N
1/N
N∑
j=1
|xj − yj |1/2
 ≤N
1/N
N∑
j=1
|xj − yj |

1/2
=
√
N (‖x − y‖1)1/2
where the last inequality follows from Jensen inequality.
Then the Ho¨lder continuity condition immediately follows from above.
Corollary D.2. Let function v˜ : ∆d+1 → R+ be defined as v˜(x) = 〈v,x〉+ηH(x) for some η > 0. Suppose
that each coordinate of v is non-negative and upper bounded by Vmax. Then the function is (
√
d +1 +
Vmax,1/2)-Ho¨lder continuous w.r.t. ℓ1-norm.
Lemma 4.3. Let p ∈ Rd+1 any real-valued vector and let p′ = Convert(p). Then for any vector v ∈ Rd+1>0
such that vd+1 = 0,
argmax
j∈[d+1]
[vj − pj ] = argmax
j∈[d+1]
[vj − p′j ]
Furthermore, p′j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [d].
Proof. To show that each coordinate of p′ is non-negative, note that p′d+1 = 0 and
p′j = (pj − pd+1)−min{0,min
j ′∈[d]
(pj ′ − pd+1)} ≥ (pj − pd+1)−min
j ′∈[d]
(pj ′ − pd+1) ≥ 0.
To show that the preference of the buyer remains the same under the two price vectors, we
consider two cases: buyer will either choose the last item, or select one of the first d items.
Suppose that we are in the first case. Then we know that vd+1−pd+1 ≥maxj ′∈[d](vj ′ −pj ′), and it
follows that vd+1−p′d+1 = vd+1−(pd+1−pd+1) ≥maxj ′∈[d](vj ′ −(pj ′ −pd+1)). Note that for each j ′ ∈ [d],
we also have p′j ′ ≥ (pj ′ − pd+1), and this means
vd+1 − p′d+1 ≥max
j ′∈[d]
(vj ′ − p′j ′ ).
Therefore, the buyer will continue to choose item (d +1).
Next consider the second case in which the buyer chooses an item j∗ ∈ [d] under the price
vector p. Note when we construct p′, the prices for the first d items are translated by the same
amount, so we have
j∗ = argmax
j∈[d]
[vj − pj ] = argmax
j∈[d]
[vj − p′j ]
37
Now it suffices to show that the buyer will not select the last item under p′. To show that, we will
further consider two sub-cases: either minj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1) < 0 or minj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1) ≥ 0. Suppose
that minj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1) < 0. Let j△ = argminj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1), then
vj ∗ − p′j ∗ = vj ∗ − pj ∗ + pj△ ≥ vj△ − pj△ + pj△ = vj△ > 0 = vd+1 − p′d+1,
this means the buyer will strictly prefer j∗. Suppose that minj ′∈[d](pj ′ − pd+1) ≥ 0. Let
vj ∗ − p′j ∗ = vj ∗ − pj ∗ + pd+1 ≥ vd+1 − pd+1 + pd+1 = vd+1 − p′d+1
which also implies that the buyer will still prefer j∗ to the empty item.
Lemma 4.4. Fix any price vector p ∈ Rd+1+ , parameter η > 0, and any distribution ψ over value vectors
in Rd+1>0 . Let x
′ be the estimate output by Sim(p,η), then Eψ,Sim [x′] = x∗v˜(p).
Proof. Note that the distribution of prices D(p) satisfies
x∗
ψ˜
(p) = E
ψ
argmax
x∈∆d+1
[〈v − p,x〉+ ηH(x)]
 = E
ψ,p′∼D(p)
argmax
x∈∆d+1
[〈v − p′ ,x〉]
 ,
which recovers our lemma.
Algorithm 4 Learning the price vector to optimize social welfare for unit-demand buyers and
indivisible goods: OWel-UD(α,δ,s)
Input: Target accuracy α, confidence parameter δ, and per-round expected demand bound s
Initialize: ε = α/2, η = α/(2 log(d +1))
Run OWel(ε,δ, s); For each price vector p queried by OWel, obtain an unbiased estimate for
x∗
ψ˜
(p) by calling Sim(p,η)
Let pˆ be the price vector output by OWel
Output: the distribution over prices Dˆ =D(p)
Lemma 4.5. Fix any regularization parameter η. Suppose that pˆ is an ε-approximately optimal price
vector for the η-regularized problem. Then the distribution of prices Dˆ =D(pˆ) satisfies
SW(Dˆ) ≥OPTlot − ε − η log(d +1).
Proof. Let OPTη be the welfare achieved by the optimal fixed price vector pη in the η-regularized
problem. Then by definition of OPTη
E
vi∼ψ
[
〈v − c,x⋆i 〉+ ηH(x⋆i )
]
≤OPTη
Since the entropy function is non-negative, it follows that Evi∼ψ
[
〈v − c,x⋆i 〉
]
= OPTlot ≤OPTη .
Next, we will show that there exists a price vector pη induces the optimal fractional allocation
in the regularized problem. Let xη be optimal fractional allocation for the η-regularized problem
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such that x
η
ψ˜
= Ev∼ψ˜
[
x
η
v
]
. By Lemma 3.7, we know that there exists a price vector that induces the
expected x
η
ψ˜
and the associated randomized allocation. By the accuracy guarantee of pˆ, we have
E
v˜∼ψ˜
[v˜(x∗v˜(pˆ))− 〈c,x∗v˜(pˆ)〉] ≥OPTη − ε ≥OPTlot − ε.
Furthermore, by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we can rewrite
E
v˜∼ψ˜
[〈v − c,x∗v˜(pˆ)〉] = E
v∼ψ
[〈v − c,x∗v˜(pˆ)〉+ ηH(x∗v˜(pˆ))] = E
v∼ψ
[
〈v − c,x∗v(Dˆ)〉
]
+ η E
v∼ψ
[H(x∗v˜(pˆ))]
where x∗v(D) = Ep∼D [x∗v(p)] is the randomized allocationD induces for each valuation v. Following
from the fact the entropy term in regularized valuation is bounded by η log(d +1), we have
SW(Dˆ) = E
v∼ψ
[
〈v − c,x∗v(Dˆ)〉
]
≥OPTlot − ε − η log(d +1).
which recovers our bound.
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